

Attacking Android

one application at a time

source**to**oad



Our plan today

- Learn about APKs
- Reverse Engineering Techniques
- Application examples
- Android Security Enhancements
- Tips to prevent



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Goals

- Understand Format
- Learn some tools
- Extract
 - Assets
 - Logic
- Rebuild



Unzipping an APK

total 12M

```
drwxrwxr-x  7 ibotpeaches 4.0K Aug  4 08:49 .
drwxrwxr-x  4 ibotpeaches 4.0K Aug  4 08:49 ..
-rw-rw-r--  1 ibotpeaches 21K Sep 29  2065 AndroidManifest.xml
drwxrwxr-x 19 ibotpeaches 4.0K Aug  4 08:49 assets
-rw-rw-r--  1 ibotpeaches 9.6M Sep 29  2065 classes.dex
drwxrwxr-x  4 ibotpeaches 4.0K Aug  4 08:49 com
drwxrwxr-x  4 ibotpeaches 4.0K Aug  4 08:49 lib
drwxrwxr-x  3 ibotpeaches 4.0K Aug  4 08:49 META-INF
-rw-rw-r--  1 ibotpeaches 2.3K Sep 29  2065 NDK_LICENSES
drwxrwxr-x 24 ibotpeaches 4.0K Aug  4 08:49 res
-rw-rw-r--  1 ibotpeaches 2.1M Sep 29  2065 resources.arsc
```

→ unzip git:(master) X █

Unzipping an APK

```
total 12M
drwxrwxr-x  7 lbotpeaches 4.0K Aug  4 08:49 .
drwxrwxr-x  4 lbotpeaches 4.0K Aug  4 08:49 ..
-rw-rw-r--  1 lbotpeaches 21K Sep 29 2065 AndroidManifest.xml
drwxrwxr-x 19 lbotpeaches 4.0K Aug  4 08:49 assets
-rw-rw-r--  1 lbotpeaches 9.6M Sep 29 2065 classes.dex
drwxrwxr-x  4 lbotpeaches 4.0K Aug  4 08:49 com
drwxrwxr-x  4 lbotpeaches 4.0K Aug  4 08:49 lib
drwxrwxr-x  3 lbotpeaches 4.0K Aug  4 08:49 META-INF
-rw-rw-r--  1 lbotpeaches 2.3K Sep 29 2065 NDK_LICENSES
drwxrwxr-x 24 lbotpeaches 4.0K Aug  4 08:49 res
-rw-rw-r--  1 lbotpeaches 2.1M Sep 29 2065 resources.arsc
➔ unzip git:(master) ✕
```


Whats in an APK?

- **arsc/xml** files
 - strings, layouts, images, assets
- **dex** files
 - java/kotlin code
- **so** files
 - libraries, game engines, native code

Android XML (AXML)

```
1  u040\"<Vt0000$0Rl000000
•  .BZh000000*Th000000X\n000
•  ,4BVz006r00J00.l00 n 0 0 D
2  ~
3  0
4  D`00P006t0600J0T00b000X
•  l000J0bv00\v0,8L0N0000,P\
•  dx000000v0F0000d0l00000
•  d 0
•  b!0!""6"0"0"0"t#0#0#0$0$%|%0%.&0&0&&'^'0'2(0(0(d)0)0)$*
•  V*f*0*J+0+0,0,0,6~~0-(.0./j/0/0N000installLocationv
•  ersionCodeversionNameminSdkVersiontargetSdkVersion
```

If only we had a tool...



AXML - Disassembled

```
1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="no"?><manifest
• xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk/res/android" android:installLocation="auto"
• package="com.snapchat.android" platformBuildVersionCode="26" platformBuildVersionName="8.0.0">
2   <supports-screens android:anyDensity="true" android:largeScreens="true" android:normalScreens="true"
•   android:smallScreens="true" android:xlargeScreens="true"/>
3   <uses-permission android:name="com.google.android.c2dm.permission.RECEIVE"/>
4   <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.GET_ACCOUNTS"/>
5   <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.WAKE_LOCK"/>
6   <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.INTERNET"/>
7   <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.ACCESS_WIFI_STATE"/>
8   <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE"/>
```

Tool: Apktool

- Disassemble resources/source
- Rebuild application
- Open source
 - 6~ million downloads
 - Amazing contributors



Types of **Attacks**

- **Network Attacks**
 - MITM, Proxy
- **Source Attacks**
 - Application modification
- **Hook Attacks**
 - Xposed, Substrate



Network Attack

graph.facebook.com		06:20:58	12300 ms	5.51 KB	Complete
service.supercell.net		06:20:58	264 ms	4.13 KB	Complete
inbox.clashofclans.com		06:21:01	266 ms	4.25 KB	Complete
inbox.clashofclans.com		06:21:02	7772 ms	1.03 MB	Complete
b46f744d64acd2191eda-3720c0374d47e9a...	/a23444f47413a7430f15150e47254db166337f55/sc/news_tex.sc	06:21:03	320 ms	54.93 KB	Complete
b46f744d64acd2191eda-3720c0374d47e9a...	/a23444f47413a7430f15150e47254db166337f55/sc/news.sc	06:21:03	184 ms	15.91 KB	Complete
www.google-analytics.com		06:21:03	162 ms	281 bytes	Failed
b46f744d64acd2191eda-3720c0374d47e9a...	/a23444f47413a7430f15150e47254db166337f55/logic/townhall_levels.csv	06:21:03	117 ms	1.82 KB	Complete
b46f744d64acd2191eda-3720c0374d47e9a...	/a23444f47413a7430f15150e47254db166337f55/logic/locales.csv	06:21:03	150 ms	1.39 KB	Complete
b46f744d64acd2191eda-3720c0374d47e9a...	/a23444f47413a7430f15150e47254db166337f55/logic/leagues2.csv	06:21:03	248 ms	1,005 bytes	Complete
b46f744d64acd2191eda-3720c0374d47e9a...	/a23444f47413a7430f15150e47254db166337f55/logic/heroes.csv	06:21:04	173 ms	4.09 KB	Complete
b46f744d64acd2191eda-3720c0374d47e9a...	/a23444f47413a7430f15150e47254db166337f55/logic/gem_bundles.csv	06:21:04	234 ms	3.49 KB	Complete
b46f744d64acd2191eda-3720c0374d47e9a...	/a23444f47413a7430f15150e47254db166337f55/logic/characters.csv	06:21:04	35 ms	8.87 KB	Complete
b46f744d64acd2191eda-3720c0374d47e9a...	/a23444f47413a7430f15150e47254db166337f55/logic/buildings.csv	06:21:04	46 ms	12.99 KB	Complete
b46f744d64acd2191eda-3720c0374d47e9a...	/a23444f47413a7430f15150e47254db166337f55/csv/texts_patch.csv	06:21:04	75 ms	23.22 KB	Complete
b46f744d64acd2191eda-3720c0374d47e9a...	/a23444f47413a7430f15150e47254db166337f55/csv/news.csv	06:21:04	31 ms	2.50 KB	Complete
b46f744d64acd2191eda-3720c0374d47e9a...	/a23444f47413a7430f15150e47254db166337f55/csv/client_globals.csv	06:21:04	34 ms	5.25 KB	Complete
b46f744d64acd2191eda-3720c0374d47e9a...	/a23444f47413a7430f15150e47254db166337f55/csv/billing_packages.csv	06:21:04	38 ms	1.64 KB	Complete

Tool: Charles Proxy

- Monitor Requests
- Proxy Requests
- View SSL/HTTPS Traffic
- \$\$
- Free Alternative - Fiddler



No SSL

- Contents plaintext
- Allows easy rewriting
- Simple proxy
- Downloads csv file

Name	Value
URL	http://b46f744d64acd2
Status	Complete
Response Code	200 OK
Protocol	HTTP/1.1
SSL	-
Method	GET
Kept Alive	No
Content-Type	application/octet-strea
Client Address	/192.168.1.222
Remote Address	b46f744d64acd2191eda
▶ Connection	
▼ Timing	
Request Start Time	10/10/17 06:21:03
Request End Time	10/10/17 06:21:04
Response Start Time	10/10/17 06:21:04
Response End Time	10/10/17 06:21:04
Duration	248 ms
DNS	0 ms
Connect	93 ms
SSL Handshake	-
Request	0 ms
Response	1 ms
Latency	154 ms
Speed	3.96 KB/s
Request Speed	0 B/s
Response Speed	698.24 KB/s
▼ Size	
▶ Request	290 bytes

Uh oh.

```
1  ]?&?MF.??>( ?o?????k????????@?+?qgA??u( bb?????S5?????k??>"?S?mN??(
2  ???$?L?7????X?????r???z???U.K?]??i?L2?z? Nb0??F?}?/?ý?&??? 'E?>G?2-
3  f?????l?Ś□?????,t?DJk?'??2`??a??;X?w?~???+p?5???.0M□Q?Jn?   ???U
•  ???iB.Ft*??i?Y?p?.?3?y?_Z??Y???<U??1WK?M?tz?_U?nRQ?:?n???K0???>
•  t?????]
```

Decoding CSV File

- Not encryption
- Probably compression
 - .bz2 / .gz
 - .lzma / .lzo
 - .Z

Decoding CSV File

```
lzma
```

```
00339ed8 LZMAReader: Unable to read full header
```

```
00339f00 LZMAReader: lzham_decompress_init failed
```

```
00339f30 LZMAReader: not LZMA or LZHAM file probably
```

```
0035ab30 SC m_pLZMAReader != NULL
```

```
0047edab LZMAReader: Unable open file
```

Tool: Binary Ninja

- Reverse Engineering platform
- Strings, Disassembly
- Scripting
- \$
- Free Alternative - Radare2



Reading CSV File

→ csv binwalk animations.csv

DECIMAL	HEXADECIMAL	DESCRIPTION
-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----

→ csv binwalk animations.csv

DECIMAL	HEXADECIMAL	DESCRIPTION
-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----
0	0x0	LZMA compressed data, properties: 0x5D, dictionary size: 262144 bytes, uncompressed size: 116453 bytes

Tool: binwalk

- Identify executable code / custom files
- On GitHub (free)
- Custom magic database

```
root@kali:~# binwalk -B dd-wrt.v24-13064_VINT_mini.bin
```

DECIMAL	HEX	DESCRIPTION

0	0x0	TRX firmware header, little endian, header size: 28 bytes, image size: 2945024 bytes, CRC32: 0x1C
28	0x1C	gzip compressed data, from Unix, NULL date: Wed Dec 31 19:00:00 1969, max compression
2472	0x9A8	LZMA compressed data, properties: 0x6E, dictionary size: 2097152 bytes, uncompressed size: 2097152 bytes
622592	0x98000	Squashfs filesystem, little endian, DD-WRT signature, version 3.0, size: 2320835 bytes, 547

Tweaked **LZMA** header


- Header was modified
- Header required tweaks
- 4 additional bytes of padding
- Trial and error

Decoded CSV File

Name	AttackCost	ResourceStorageLootPercentage	DarkElixirStorageLootPercentage
String	int	int	int
1	10	20	6
2	50	20	6
3	75	20	6
4	110	20	6
5	170	20	6
6	250	20	6
7	380	18	6
8	580	16	6
9	750	14	5
10	900	12	4
11	1000	10	4

Snapchat Time

- Send photos, disappear after gone
- Encrypted photos so MITM useless
- Unless - You know the decryption



Snapchat in 2013

```
# direct methods
.method static constructor <clinit>()V
    .locals 1


    .prologue
    .line 8
    const-string v0, "1234567891123456"

    sput-object v0, Lcom/snapchat/android/util/AESEncrypt;->ENCRYPT_KEY:Ljava/lang/String;

    .line 9
    const-string v0, "M02cnQ51Ji97vwT4"

    sput-object v0, Lcom/snapchat/android/util/AESEncrypt;->ENCRYPT_KEY_2:Ljava/lang/String;


    return-void
.end method
```



Snapchat Encryption 2013


- 2013 - AES (ECB)
 - **Electronic Codebook**
 - Hardcoded key
 - Other key (ENCRYPT_KEY) unused

Context: AES (ECB)



Electronic Codebook (ECB) mode encryption

Snapchat in 2014




```
const-string v1, "android_id"
invoke-static {v0, v1}, Landroid/provider/Settings$Secure;.->getString(Landroid/content/ContentResolver;Ljava/lang/String;)Ljava/lang/String;
sget-object v0, Landroid/os/Build;.->FINGERPRINT:Ljava/lang/String;
const-string v1, "MD5"
invoke-static {v1}, Ljava/security/MessageDigest;.->getInstance(Ljava/lang/String;)Ljava/security/MessageDigest;
move-result-object v1
invoke-virtual {v0}, Ljava/lang/String;.->getBytes()[B
move-result-object v0
invoke-virtual {v1, v0}, Ljava/security/MessageDigest;.->update([B)V
const-string v0, "seems legit..."
invoke-virtual {v0}, Ljava/lang/String;.->getBytes()[B
move-result-object v0
invoke-virtual {v1, v0}, Ljava/security/MessageDigest;.->update([B)V
```



Snapchat Encryption 2014


- 2014 - AES / CBC
 - Cipher **B**lock **C**haining
 - Random IV/Key per image
 - IV/Key saved to encrypted file
 - *md5*(android_id + "seems legit...")
 - Decrypt cold file, obtain IV/Key

Context: AES (CBC)




Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode encryption

Man in the Middle



Snapchat MITM

- Hmm
- MITM Failed
- Requests are denied
- Onward to door 2




Snapchat MITM

```
Receive action: android.intent.action.PACKAGE_ADDED
mHandler: 3
Handler: 9 phoneId: 0
Verification result: checking for a statement with source a <
  a: "https://snapchat.com"
>
, relation delegate_permission/common.handle_all_urls, and target b <
  a: "com.snapchat.android"
  b <
    a: "A4:0D:A8:0A:59:D1:70:CA:A9:50:CF:15:C1:8C:45:4D:47:A3:9B:26:98:9D:8B:64:0E:CD:74:5B:A7:1B:F5:DC"
  >
>
--> false.
Verification 4 complete. Success:false. Failed hosts:www.snapchat.com,snapchat.com.
```

SSL Pinning

- Enforce certificate used
- Prevents bogus cert, patches MITM
- Can backfire if not proper
- Leaf/Intermediate/Root Pinning



Snapchat Search

```
ibotpeaches@ivorytower:~/Desktop/NewDevFest/snapchat$ egrep -r 'checkClientTrusted|checkServerTrusted' *
Binary file build/apk/classes6.dex matches
Binary file build/apk/classes5.dex matches
Binary file build/apk/classes4.dex matches
smali_classes4/hvx.smali:.method public final checkClientTrusted([Ljava/security/cert/X509Certificate;Ljava/lang/String;)V
smali_classes4/hvx.smali:.method public final checkServerTrusted([Ljava/security/cert/X509Certificate;Ljava/lang/String;)V
smali_classes4/hvx.smali:    invoke-interface {v0, p1, p2}, Ljavax/net/ssl/X509TrustManager;->checkServerTrusted([Ljava/security/cert/X509Certificate;Ljava/lang/String;)V
smali_classes6/ywm.smali:    const-string v2, "checkServerTrusted"
smali_classes6/yls$d.smali:.method public final checkClientTrusted([Ljava/security/cert/X509Certificate;Ljava/lang/String;)V
smali_classes6/yls$d.smali:    invoke-interface {v0, p1, p2}, Ljavax/net/ssl/X509TrustManager;->checkClientTrusted([Ljava/security/cert/X509Certificate;Ljava/lang/String;)V
smali_classes6/yls$d.smali:.method public final checkServerTrusted([Ljava/security/cert/X509Certificate;Ljava/lang/String;)V
smali_classes6/yls$d.smali:    invoke-interface {v0, p1, p2}, Ljavax/net/ssl/X509TrustManager;->checkServerTrusted([Ljava/security/cert/X509Certificate;Ljava/lang/String;)V
ibotpeaches@ivorytower:~/Desktop/NewDevFest/snapchat$ █
```


Snapchat smali

```
.method public final checkServerTrusted([Ljava/security/cert/X509Certificate;Ljava/lang/String;)V
    .locals 6

    .prologue
    const/4 v2, 0x1

    const/4 v3, 0x0

    .line 47
    iget-object v0, p0, Lhvx;->b:Ljavax/net/ssl/X509TrustManager;

    invoke-interface {v0, p1, p2}, Ljavax/net/ssl/X509TrustManager;->checkServerTrusted([Ljava/security/cert/X509Certificate;Ljava/lang/String;)V

    .line 59
    aget-object v0, p1, v3
```

Snapchat Patched

```
.method public final checkServerTrusted([Ljava/security/cert/X509Certificate;Ljava/lang/String;)V
    .locals 6


    .prologue
    return-void
    const/4 v2, 0x1

    const/4 v3, 0x0

    .line 47
    iget-object v0, p0, Lhvx;->b:Ljavax/net/ssl/X509TrustManager;


    invoke-interface {v0, p1, p2}, Ljavax/net/ssl/X509TrustManager;->checkServerTrusted([Ljava/security/cert/X509Certificate;Ljava/lang/String;)V

    .line 59
    aget-object v0, p1, v3
```




Snapchat Rebuilt

- Hmm
- Rebuilt APK is rejected
- Some sort of detection
- Onward to door 3



Xposed Framework

- Hooks “code”, no modifying apps
- Install onto system
- Requires ROOT
- Nougat (7.0) - recent release
- Oreo (8.0) - nothing official



Snapchat **Hooked**

- Success
- Using an Xposed module
- Newer Android is no go



Android 7.0 - Nougat

- NSP Rules
- Debug overrides
- Standard CAs
- Ignore User certs
- API24+

```
<network-security-config>
  <base-config>
    <trust-anchors>
      <!-- Trust preinstalled CAs -->
      <certificates src="system" />
    </trust-anchors>
  </base-config>
</network-security-config>
```


7.0 - Signature Scheme v2

- Full block signature
- Replaces v1 (jar signature)
- Modifying applications



Introducing **SafetyNet**

- Device passes CTS
- Emulator Detection
- Root Detection
- API Hooking Detection
- Other attacks

Android Pay cannot be used

Google is unable to verify that your device or the software running on it is Android compatible

DISMISS

Magisk & Root Switch

- Systemless Root
- Reset props
- Tricks callers
- Pairs with Xposed



SafetyNet v2

- Basic Integrity
- DroidGuard
- Idle (12h checks)
- Safe Browsing, reCAPTCHA
- Zygote Inspection



Cat n Mouse

- suhide
- root switch
- Magisk (Magic Mask)
- Systemless Xposed



Android 8.0 - Oreo

- SSL downgrading fixes
- ANDROID_ID is tweaked
- Verified Boot System
- Broke Xposed (see the pattern?)



In Closing

- Never trust the client
- SSL is a requirement
- Crypto is tough. Don't reinvent
- Iterate, sunset old versions

Q / A
#DevFestFL



source**toad**

@iBotPeaches

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